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Many countries in the modern world face constitutional changes. Sometimes these changes are related to the formation of a new political system, the transformation of a democracy, or changes in consolidated democracies. Constitutional amendments are a very complex issue, and many important circumstances need to be taken into account in their implementation. Richard Albert's book is the latest brilliant and complex study that shows countries the way in which constitutional amendments should be drafted, adopted, implemented, and under what conditions this process should be based.

By mapping out the intellectual scenery of constitutional amendment rules, Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions offers a remarkable theoretical, doctrinal, and comparative study of the most pressing questions on constitutional change.

The book by Richard Albert on Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions is an outstanding achievement, which should not come as a surprise. Albert is one of the most imaginative and prolific authors writing on constitutional change, and his new book does not disappoint. In Constitutional Amendments, Albert comprehensively examines the design of formal amendment rules, informal change, constitutional unamendability, and more.

What is the most important part of a constitution? In the introductory chapter of his book ‘Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions’, Richard Albert provides an unlikely response: amendment procedures. The remainder of the book offers a compelling defense for this position and makes a case for placing the often-forgotten subject of constitutional amendment at the center of the modern study of constitutional change.

Constitutional change is not a totally discretionary derived constituent power (a power generally held by the legislature and, when called upon to elect representatives, by the citizenry); it is an activity carried out following specified procedures while preserving consistency with respect to delineations set out as fundamental constitutional principles by the originating holder of constituent power.

At their core, amendment rules reflect both faith and distrust in political actors: they authorize alterations to the constitution, though they limit how and when constitutional modifications are permissible. Given the many functions served by these essential rules of amendment, we would expect constitutions to entrench them, and indeed almost all of them do.

The National Law School of India Review is proud to announce NLSIR Online’s first Book Symposium. In a series of NLSIR Online posts over the upcoming weeks, constitutional law experts from across the globe will engage with Professor Richard Albert’s (William Stamps Farish Professor in Law, Professor of Government, and Director of Constitutional Studies - University of Texas) latest book, Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking, and Changing Constitutions (Oxford University Press 2019), through book reviews.

The recent judgement of the Delhi High Court in Interdigital Technology v. Xiaomi Corporationon the structure of ‘Confidentiality Clubs’ to ensure confidentiality of sensitive information/documents in litigation, has far-reaching implications. The Court rejected a prayer that suggested the preclusion of a Party’s in-house representative/employee (other than the advocate or independent expert) from access to the ‘Confidentiality Club’. This was a patent infringement case involving Standard Essential Patents (‘SEPs’) that cover technologies which are essential for devices to be standard-compliant.

While government measures against free speech have some global history, a new phenomenon that has emerged is the attack by the judiciary on free speech. In this vein, Indian courts have started to impose speech restrictions as conditions of bail. In this post, I argue that the approach of restraining speech through bail orders is legally and politically problematic.

In 2019, the Supreme Court of India (‘the Court’) delivered seminal judgments with regard to the role of women in the armed forces. In two landmark rulings, The Secretary, Ministry ofDefencev. Babita Puniya, (‘Babita Puniya’) and Union of Indiav. Lt. Cdr. Annie Nagaraja, (‘Annie Nagaraja’), the Court struck down the discriminatory policy of not allowing permanent commission for women in the Army and Navy. This article argues that the recent judgments in Babita Puniyaand Annie Nagaraja only scratch the proverbial patriarchal surface of institutional roadblocks that the Constitution still preserves.